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Abstraction and Infinity is a very rich and rewarding book. It provides not merely a 
much-needed detailed account of the history of so called definitions by abstraction or 
abstraction principles but it also advances the current philosophical debate about the 
foundational status of such principles. These themes are presented in a beautifully 
clear prose which makes this book, quite simply, a joy to read—not something that is 
easily accomplished for a book in the history and philosophy of mathematics.  
 
The book is divided into four chapters. The first two chapters focus on the history of 
mathematical practice with regards to definitions by abstraction. The third chapter 
offers a short history of the notion of infinity and then presents two contemporary 
theories of measuring the size of infinite sets. The last chapter brings together the 
two themes–abstraction and infinity–and develops a new kind of criticism against 
Neo-Logicism: (one of the) 21st century proponents of definitions by abstraction. 
 
Neo-Logicism, or sometimes also labelled Neo-Fregeanism or Abstractionism, is a 
view that has its origin in Wright (1983). The story is now all too familiar, so I’ll keep it 
short: Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) sought to establish Logicism—the view that 
arithmetic and other branches of mathematics can be reduced to logic. However, his 
project failed after Russell informed Frege that one of his axioms, Basic Law V, is 
inconsistent. The Neo-Logicist aims to revive Frege’s project by replacing Basic Law 
V with a different foundational principle known as Hume’s Principle. Both share a 
common form, namely they are both abstraction principles:1  
 
(AP)   §𝛼 = §𝛽	 ↔ 	𝛼 ∼ 𝛽  
where ‘§’ is a term-forming operator applicable to expression of the type of 𝛼 and 𝛽 
(introducing ‘abstracta’), and ∼ is an equivalence relation on entities denoted by 
expressions of that type. Frege’s Basic Law V, involves co-extensionality of functions 
as the relevant equivalence relation on the right-hand side, introducing value-ranges 
as abstracta:2  
(BLV)  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑓 𝑥 = 	𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑔(𝑥) 	↔ 	∀𝑥(𝑓(𝑥) 	= 	𝑔(𝑥))  
while Hume’s Principle employs equinumerosity as the relevant equivalence relation, 
introducing cardinal numbers:3 
																																																						
1 For simplicity, I omit prefixed universal quantifiers from each abstraction principle. 
2 In words: the value range of f is identical to the value range of g iff f and g have the same value for 
any argument. 
3 In words: the cardinal number belonging to the concept F is identical to the cardinal number 
belonging to the concept G iff there is a one to one correspondence between the objects falling under 
F and those falling under G. 
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(HP)   𝑁𝑥: 𝐹𝑥	 = 	𝑁𝑥: 𝐺𝑥	 ↔ 	𝐹	 ≈ 	𝐺  
Thanks to Frege’s theorem, first proved in Wright (1983)4, we know that HP 
embedded in standard second-order logic suffices to derive second-order Peano 
Arithmetic–a result which led to the revival of the Fregean programme. The last 30 
years produced many interesting mathematical results (e.g. attempts to expand the 
abstractionist programme to real analysis and set theory) and generated wide-
ranging philosophical debates about the semantics, epistemology, and ontology of 
abstraction principles.5 However, there has so far been very little debate about the 
history of the use of abstraction principles.  
From this perspective, Mancosu’s first two chapters are an extremely welcome 
contribution which highlights the widespread use of definition by abstraction in 
mathematics throughout its history. Examples of the use of abstraction principles 
range from Euclid to Leibniz to early 19th century mathematicians. Mancosu shows 
how prevalent such definitions were before Frege, and he offers examples of their 
use in geometry, number theory, and physics. 
Yet, Mancosu achieves much more than offering a mere history of abstraction 
principles. For example, based on his historical overview Mancosu distinguishes 
three options of how to interpret the abstractum of an abstraction principle: 
1. It is a representative of the relevant equivalence class, i.e. one of its objects 
(characteristic of its use in 19th century number theory). 
2. The abstractum of an element in the domain is the equivalence class which 
contains that element. 
3. The abstracta are sui generis and neither coincide with an element of the 
domain nor with an equivalence class (Grassmann’s, as well as the Neo-
Logicist conception). 
Mancosu uses this threefold distinction to identify views held by different 
abstractionists and to highlight that achieving clarity with respect to this distinction 
led to genuine progress. In that context, Mancosu offers a re-assessment of Frege’s 
contribution. While noting important influences on Frege, in particular Grassmann6, 
he argues that Frege provided the first clear characterisation of interpreting 
abstraction principles along option 2. Moreover, Frege was likely the first person to 
introduce and discuss higher-order abstraction principles.  
Another highlight of chapter 2 are passages (cf. p.67f.) that resemble more a crime 
																																																						
4 Compare Heck (2011), p.5ff. for a history of Frege’s theorem. 
5 To indulge in ruthless self-promotion: compare Ebert & Rossberg (2016) – a volume dedicated to 
recent developments on Neo-Logicism. For a summary of the status belli, consult our introduction.  
6 Mancosu here challenges Wilson (1992) who identified von Staudt as the main influence. 
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story than a history of mathematics book. By drawing on numerous sources and on 
intriguing circumstantial evidence, Mancosu identifies the “teachers” that Frege likely 
had in mind when in the most famous passage of Grundlagen (§64), Frege rejects 
the use of the direction abstraction principle to explain the equivalence relation 
parallelism on the basis of a prior grasp of the concept direction.  
Overall, I thoroughly enjoyed reading these two chapters. Mancosu chooses just the 
right level of detail while managing to cover the expansive history of abstraction 
principles. He also leaves important reminders to the “a-historically”-minded 
philosopher that all too often more recent debates have important precursors in its 
history. Moreover, the many intriguing connections that Mancosu uncovers raise new 
questions: for example, Mancosu shows how Helmholtz used definitions by 
abstraction to define weights, brightness, pitch of tones, and many more. One may 
wonder whether these applications have influenced Frege in thinking that it is just 
these kinds of principles that are particularly suited to guarantee the application of 
mathematics? Also, Frege’s argument–the notorious Caesar Problem–that 
challenges the adequacy of HP, or indeed of abstraction principles generally, as a 
genuine form of definition reappears throughout the late 19th/early 20th century, in 
e.g. the Italian school and it is alluded to by Fraenkel. So, one may wonder, was 
Frege the first person to have lodged this objection? 
Chapter 3 changes tack and focuses on infinity or rather on how to measure sizes of 
infinity. The core issue is “the paradox of infinity”: On the one hand, we have the 
part-whole intuition (PW) which states that if A is a proper subcollection of B then A 
is smaller in size than B. On the hand, it seems correct to say, following Cantor, that 
A and B are the same in size if and only if there will be a one to one correspondence 
between A and B. However, these two intuitions lead to a contradiction for infinite 
sets: consider A to be the set of even natural numbers and B the set of natural 
numbers.  
In this chapter, Mancosu argues convincingly against adopting a “whig history” 
approach where all roads inevitably lead to Cantor. While the historical discussion is 
kept fairly short, Detective Mancosu still manages to unearth historical gems such as 
documents from the Islamic philosopher and mathematician Thabit ibn Qurra (9th 
century A.D) who defended the idea of different sizes of infinity with regards to 
collections of natural numbers. Also, Mancosu’s discussion of Maignan and Bolzano, 
who both defended the PW intuition, is exceptionally clear and interesting. 
The second part of the chapter is concerned with recent mathematical theories that 
aim to respect the PW principle for infinite domains. Here, Mancosu’s historical 
approach shines through. Instead of simply presenting the most developed view, we 
are first offered a brief survey of Katz’s PhD thesis from 1981 which offers the first 
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formal theory defending the PW intuition against Cantor. The remainder of the 
chapter discusses the so-called theory of numerosities.7 
Here, I won’t be able to cover the details of the theory, but what is important to note 
is that numerosities are introduced as measures that are more fine-grained than 
cardinalities. Hence, 
(1) If two collections have the same size, then there is a 1-1 correspondence 
between its objects 
remains true8 if size means “numerosity”; the other direction  
(2) If there is a 1-1 correspondence, then the two collections have the same size 
is, however, false. 
The theory of numerosity goes some way to capture the relevant PW intuition, but it 
has some shortcomings: firstly, the current theory is restricted to “universes”: 𝑉(𝑋) =	 𝑉<(𝑋)<∈>  over a base 𝑋 of size less than ℵ@. Of course, this may be far reaching 
enough for some, yet one may wonder why it is that some larger sets don’t have a 
numerosity. Secondly, the numerosity function (its existence is equivalent to the 
existence of an ultrafilter) is defined on sets that can be linearly ordered, and so 
again why is it that only those kinds of sets can be given a “numerosity”? Lastly, and 
most importantly, and as Mancosu himself notes, numerosities are sensitive to the 
relevant label or ultrafilter. Hence, whether the even numbers have the same 
numerosity as the odd numbers depends and varies with the choice of ultrafilter. 
Since there is no “canonical” ultrafilter, it seems that “having a certain numerosity” is, 
ultimately, a relational property between some collection and a given filter. Yet don’t 
we think of the size of a collection as more akin to a primary property that 
supervenes on, and is invariant with, its extension? 
Be that as it may, the force of Mancosu’s objection against Neo-Logicism, does not 
rely on a prior acceptance of the theory of numerosities. Rather, chapter 3 is best 
understood as providing an important motivation that opens up the relevant 
conceptual space for Mancosu to launch his challenge.  
Chapter 4 sets out the good company objection which takes its cue from various 
passages in (Heck 2011). In a first step, Mancosu shows how we can get countably 
infinitely many different abstraction principles (without relying on the theory of 
numerosities) that agree on finite sets but assign different cardinalities to infinite 
sets. He then shows that these abstraction principles suffice to prove the axioms of 
																																																						
7 As introduced in Benci and Di Nasso (2003). 
8 This direction was recently challenged in Whittle (2017). 
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second-order Peano Arithmetic and meet other constraints that the Neo-Logicist 
proposed for a good abstraction principle (stability, non-arrogance, etc.). So, HP and 
all the other principles that Mancosu offers, are in “good company”. However, given 
that these abstraction principles disagree when it comes to infinite sets, it seems we 
run into the following problem:  
“It is conceptually possible that any of them [i.e. abstraction principles of the kind 
alluded to above] is false, since for any principle we choose there subsists the 
conceptual possibility that it might be false. The latter claim is grounded in the fact 
that different principles assign numbers to infinite concepts in ways that contradict 
each other. But if [this] is correct we should be able to infer, again by parity of 
argument, that no one of them can be a conceptual truth. Thus HP, and all its good 
companions are not conceptual truths. This is then the ‘good company’ objection.” 
(p.186) 
Now, there are many moves that could be made against this type of challenge. 
Some are not pursued in Mancosu’s discussion: for example, one could stop thinking 
of HP as a “conceptual truth” and see it as a mere defeasible a priori truth. 
Alternatively, one could be more radical and deny that concept-constituting principles 
need be true.9 Yet, both such proposals would undermine an important aspect of the 
Neo-Logicist epistemology, namely that “the fundamental truths of number theory 
would be revealed as consequences of an explanation: a statement whose role is to 
fix the character of a certain concept.” (Wright, 1983, 153) 
The more obvious choice, which Mancosu pursues (amongst other options) and 
labels “liberal Neo-Logicism”, is to argue that, strictly speaking, each abstraction 
principle is a conceptual truth of the very concept it introduces. Hence there is no 
genuine incompatibility since each concept of number is in effect indexed to the 
relevant abstraction principle by which it is introduced. Thus, that these abstraction 
principles disagree when assigning different numbers to infinite sets is not a 
substantial disagreement.  
Mancosu’s ensuing discussion nicely shows how the good company objection raises 
numerous fundamental questions about the very aims and methods of the Neo-
Logicist programme.10 In particular, “liberal Neo-Logicism”–previously defended by 
MacBride–comes with its own challenges: e.g. this approach seems to give up on 
the special standing of HP as somehow implicit in informal arithmetical reasoning (to 
what extent this claim was ever part of the original Neo-Logicism programme is, I 
think, very much questionable). However, if that is the case, one may wonder why 
																																																						
9 Compare here Scharp (2013) and Ebert (2016).  
10 Mancosu is historically acute and draws on a previous discussion by Heck (2011) and MacBride 
(2000). 
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the Neo-Logicist focuses so much on HP. That is, is there an epistemically relevant 
difference between, Wright’s so-called “Hero” character who first learns HP and then 
derives PA, in contrast to a “Mancosian Hero” who learns any one of the other 
abstraction principles? It seems, the liberalist line might have to give up on a special 
epistemic status of HP.  
And, last but not least, the Good Company objection requires the Neo-Logicist to 
take a stance and solve the problem of cross-sortal identification: when are abstracts 
introduced by one abstraction principle the same as abstracts introduced by a 
different one? Mancosu takes on this problem in the last section of his book and 
offers a solution to a challenge set out in Cook and Ebert (2005) – but, alas, let me 
come back to that on another occasion.  
This overview should make clear that Mancosu’s good company objection is not to 
be understood as a knock-down argument, but as a wide-ranging general challenge 
that goes to the heart of the Neo-Logicist programme–a kind of challenge that, no 
doubt, will shape the future debate of this view. 
In summary, I highly recommend Mancosu’s book to philosophers and 
mathematicians interested in the philosophy or the history of mathematics and logic. 
The book is rich in historical commentary and philosophical ideas. Mancosu not only 
proves to be one of the great detectives of the history of mathematical practice but 
shows us how an historical approach to mathematical practice can, and in this case, 
does successfully move forward our current debates in the philosophy of 
mathematics.11  
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